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LAWRENCE LESSIGt
The virtue of economics is its economy.  Its sparse ontology.  Its
simplicity.  With a  few blocks, it  aims to build the world.  And with
a  few  blocks,  it  has  built  much.  Becker-ized  or  Posner-ized,
economics has given insight into the full range of human life, with
very  few  conceptual  tools.  There  have  been  critics:  those  who
complain that too much is missed; that the reduction is not without
loss; that what is essential has been lost.  But in  large measure, these
complaints miss the mark.  One does not mind pocket-sized  maps,
so long as they guide reasonably well.
Sometimes  they  do  not.  Sometimes  this  sparseness  and
simplicity  make one  miss  something important.  New  blocks  are
then needed.  Some see these gaps as pathology-evincing  a  rotten
core in  economics's foundations.  But economics  does not need a
foundation;  we  need not worry whether we can describe  its core.
When  Russell  pointed  out  the  flaw  in  Frege's  derivation  of the
foundations  to  mathematics,  the  math  curriculum  in  elementary
schools  did  not change much.  Arithmetic  goes on perfectly well
without foundations.  Economics  can as well.'
Gaps do invite something more, however, and this push suggests
two kinds of supplement.  One is the supplement of Posner:  small
additions  to the core ontology, deployed  to pragmatic ends. 2  The
other is the supplements of Elster or Hardin:  large additions to this
core ontology; whole new classes of stuff; social norms, for example,
that supplement talk of individual preferences  as  a  way to under-
stand  behavior  that  does  not quite  fit  talk  limited  to  individual
t  Professor of Law, University of Chicago Law School.  Funding provided by the
Russell Baker Scholars  Fund and the Sarah  Scaife  Foundation.  Thanks to Judge
Richard Posner for comments on an earlier draft.
' One might think that this rejection of foundations  is unprincipled lawyers' ad
hocery.  If so,  this  thought will  bnly grow  over the next  few pages,  because  my
argument  in  the  end  is  that  economics  should  add  meaning  speak  to  its  basic
ontology set, and one might well argue  that epistemically, talk about meaning is
inconsistent with the foundations of economics.  Indeed it is.  But my claim, again,
is that there is value in using the tools of economics, even if the domain over which
they are used lies outside of ecoiomics's core domain.  Or at least, we should see if
there is such a value.  Or at least again, talk of philosophical foundations should not
stop us in that search.
2 See RICHARD A. POSNER, AGING AND OLD AGE 84-94 (1995) (discussing multiple-
selves).
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preferences.'  The articles  of this Symposium are  in the  tradition
of this second supplement.  They aim to work out social norm talk,
consistent  with  the tradition  of economics or rational  choice that
they inherit.4  The aim is compatibility-the  effort to show that this
richer ontology  is  consistent with the sparseness  of the  old.  The
technique  is to link the new methods with the old.
This  is  also  the  focus  of the  two  articles  that I  was  asked  to
review for this Symposium.  Dennis Chong's article, especially, is an
effort to help the old school along.  In its breadth, it offers comfort
to  the old  school,  for it  sketches  how  an  extraordinary  range  of
otherwise "non-economic" phenomena might nonetheless fit an eco-
nomic account.5  Richard Hasen's article is more targeted:  It  picks
one puzzle for the classical theory (why people vote) and shows how
this  richer  ontology  might  solve  this puzzle.6  In  both  cases,  the
suggestion is that we can be excused for adding social norm talk to
the account, because the norm talk will advance our understanding
of human behavior, without rejecting what went before.
I  have  nothing  against  this  respect  for  (intellectual)  elders.
Economics has a tradition one ought to respect.  But I am a lawyer,
and lawyers have few respectable elders.  Law is not a science, and
in the main, our elders are a generation who proclaimed that there
were no elders.  Lawyers  are intellectual  orphans.
The orphan has a freedom that the child does not, and it is from
this position of relative freedom that I want to argue that something
more will  be needed here.  This supplemental  norm talk is  a nice
first move,  but it will not be enough.  We  will not understand  the
phenomena  upon  which  this  Symposium  focuses,  and  more
importantly,  we will not know how to regulate it, until we add yet
another block to this ontology.  It  is not enough to talk about social
norms.  We must also  speak of social meaning.
The argument for meaning  talk is this:  Norm talk  is behavior-
focused.  It  asks what a community does.  It shares with its frugal
father economics  the desire  to just observe  behavior,  without the
need  to understand  it.  The perspective  is  external,  and from this
3 See, e.g., JON ELSTER, THE CEMENT OF SOCIETY 97-152 (1989);  RUSSELL HARDIN,
COLLECTIVE  ACTION  155-228  (1982).  My point is not that these authors invented
norm talk; the centrality  of norm  talk in their work is what marks  its significance.
" I will speak of economics and rational choice  theory interchangeably, although
I mean by the former  what most commentators  think of as the latter.
5 See Dennis Chong, Values Versus Interests in  the Explanation of  Social Conflict, 144
U. PA.  L. REV.  2079  (1996).
6 See Richard L. Hasen,  Voting Without Law?, 144  U. PA.  L. REV.  2135  (1996).SOCIAL  MEANING AND  SOCIAL NORMS
external  perspective,  it describes  prices,  or  costs  associated  with
deviating from this regularity.  Ordinary behavior is thought to be
cheapest;  deviance costly.
As a first cut, this methodology is not bad.  It is just crude.  It
tries to locate a cost associated with behaviors; but the determinants
of that cost are too simple, or incomplete.  Norm talk accounts for
behavior; it does not discipline itself to account for context.  It does
not focus on the relation of behavior to context and the differences
that relation raises.
An example illustrates the point. In 1856, Preston Brooks caned
Charles Sumner on the floor of the U.S. Senate."  Social norm talk
might speak of the costs this caning created.  There is a fairly solid
anti-battering norm in most civilized societies.  Sumner suffered the
costs  of  being  battered;  Brooks  suffered  the  costs  of being  a
batterer.  Norm talk might calibrate the harm to Sumner according
to the harm that any victim of a mugging might suffer.
But the costs of this action-raising a cane and battering another
with it-have only a slight relation to the costs of a mugging.  What
was  significant  in  the caning  was  not the  deviation  from  a norm
against battery.  Its significance was its meaning.  Caning was how
a master treated a slave; it expressed the presumption that the social
status  of  the  victim  was  below  the  social  status  of the  attacker.
Caning expressed something by the very choice of weapons used, in
the same way that a challenge to a duel would have.  A challenge to
duel would  have  meant that  the  challenger  considered  the  chal-
lenged either his equal or his superior.  The challenge to duel would
have  expressed  this respect.  Depending  upon  the balance of the
social context, it is plausible that the victim of a caning is worse off
than the wounded victim of a duel:  the victim of a duel suffers only
the  risk of corporal injury, whereas  the victim  of a caning suffers
certain social injury as well.
Norm  talk  misses  this  distinction.  The  price  of caning  is  a
function of the action and the contextual understandings behind it.
Norm talk focuses on the action and ignores  the context.  Meaning
talk focuses on both.  Norm talk speaks  of the price of behaviors;
meaning  talk speaks  of prices  in particular  contexts.  Norm  talk
abstracts; meaning talk makes contingent.
The story is  well told in JACK  K.  WILLIAMS,  DUELING  IN  THE OLD  SOUTH 26
(1980).
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I am speaking  in general.  My point is  about the average,  not
about every case.  There are those who use the language  of norms
in a way that is  indistinguishable  from what I mean  by meaning,8
and there are those who use the language  of meaning in ways just
as crude as norms speak.  But my argument is not about reporting
how people speak; it is about recommending how we should speak.
We should allow norm talk to be thin and foreground-focused,  and
we should use meaning talk to speak of the salience that particular
norms  have within  a  given  social  context.  The  argument  is  not
critical  of norm  speak,  but it presses  for something  more.  It  is
about the  value  of an  interpretive  turn  in  economics;. about  the
returns that this investment might bring.
The  return  is  of  two  sorts.  One  is  descriptive,  the  other,
prescriptive.  The descriptive return  is revealed in what norm talk
tends to miss.  The examples are many, but one from each of these
two  articles  might  suffice.  Begin  with  Dennis  Chong:  Chong
describes  the  pathology  of  Senator  Packwood.  A  practice  or
discipline in Packwood's life-learned to overcome shyness-led him
to a habit of behavior-gregariousness  laced with bawdiness-which,
when  the  world  changed,  he  could not  easily  give  up.9  That  is
interesting,  plausible,  and  sad,  but what  is  troubling  is  the  next
move.  Chong likens Packwood's  dilemma to the problem faced by
inner-city  youths  who,  because  of  "the  clothes  they  wear,  the
language  they  use,  and  the  way  they  move[,]  ...  have  trouble
adjusting to the norms of 'decent' behavior required at school and
on the job."'°
But this does not follow, and we can see why from the perspec-
tive of meaning.  Packwood got himself stuck in a kind of behavior
that he could not change, a habit that he might regret.  The inner-
city  youth  does  not  face  this  sort of rut.  The  inner-city  youth's
problem is not that he has a habit of behaving "indecently" that he
just cannot shake.  Rather, the problem is  that "decency"  changes
' See, e.g.,  Peter H. Huang & Ho-Mou Wu, More Order Without More Law:  A  Theoy
of Social  Norms.and Organizational  Cultures, 10J.L. ECON. & ORGANIZATION  390, 391
(1994) (arguing that the scope of law and economics can be expanded by incorporat-
ing the role of emotions into the study of how social order can be maintained without
further law).  Their use of norm  talk is  close to what I mean by meaning talk.
' See Chong, supra note  5, at 2084 ("The irony in Packwood's  case is that times
have changed and relationships between the sexes in and out of the workplace have
been redefined, but unfortunately the traits that Packwood so deliberately learned to
smooth his path continue  to rule him like an addiction, prompting behavior that is
no longer tolerated.").
10  Id. at 2084-85.SOCIAL MEANING AND  SOCIAL NORMS
between these two very different social contexts and the youth does
not quite know who he is, or who he wants to be, in the mainstream
culture.  This is a crisis of meaning, not inertia.
A  similar  point  can  be  drawn  from  Ricgard  Hasen's  article.
Hasen describes the "snowball effect" that might occur as more and
more people violate a norm.  What explains the snowball  effect is
that there are "decreasing odds" of being punished, and therefore
individuals increasingly refuse to behave according to the norm.11
Tax evasion might be an example. 12  When tax evasion  is low, the
likelihood of punishment might be high; but as  evasion increases,
there are, Hasen  might argue, decreasing  odds that one would be
caught.
As  Dan  Kahan  has  argued,  however,  this  account  misses
something of the dynamic  in the snowball  effect." 3  For the trend
is not continuous; at a certain stage, norm-violating behaviorjumps.
To account for this jump, meaning talk is needed.
. The meaning account might proceed like this:  While everyone
is  obeying  a certain  norm, the  meaning  of obeying  that  norm is
simply conformity.  Conforming when everyone else is conforming
is  often an individual good:  One  is doing what others are doing;
one  is  behaving  appropriately.  When  norm violation  increases,
however, the meaning of obeying the norm changes.  At some point,
when  everyone  else  is  violating  a  norm-when  everyone  else  is
evading their taxes-obeying the norm makes one a "chump."  It is
no longer  the case  that the  pressure  to obey  the  norm has been
lessened solely because of the decreasing odds of being caught for
violating the norm.  Now there is an affirmative cost to obeying the
norm  as  well.  This shift would  account for a jump in  the norm-
violating  behavior  in  a  way  that  the  "decreasing  odds"  account
would not.
In both cases,  norm talk leaves  something  out.  Meaning  talk
reveals  something  more  about  the  contours  to  the  costs  of  the
different  behaviors;  it  imports  a  language  that  can  understand
discontinuities in the valuation  of similar behavior.  Meaning  talk
understands  price  relative  to  context;  norm  talk  does  not.  Put
n See Hasen, supra note 6,  at 2151.
'2 See  e.g.,J.C. Baldry, Tax Evasion Is Not a Gamble, 22 ECON.  LETTERS  333 (1986)
(describing the discontinuity caused by "moral notions" in tax-compliance  behavior).
's  See Dan M. Kahan, Social Influence, Social Meaning, and Deterrence 7-8, 15-16,
20-21 (Apr. 2, 1996) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the author) (describing the
social meaning and social influence  effects in criminal regulation).
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another way,  norm talk speaks  of nominal prices, where  meaning
talk speaks of real prices.
The  real advantage  to meaning talk,  however,  is  prescriptive.
When  one  is  norm-focused,  the  idea  of changing  a social  norm
appears extremely difficult.  The rhetoric is always about "evolving
customs" and the slow rate of behavioral change.  The picture is one
of exhorting  a group  to  act differently, and  the sense is always  of
some blob that must be pushed from all sides if it is to be moved at
all.
It might  be  that  a particular  norm  is  impervious  to  change.
Social  structures  are  differentially  plastic,  and  norms are part of
social structures.  But whether a norm is difficult to change depends
upon more  than mere  inertia.  As the  examples  above suggest,  it
depends as well upon the cost or the price of continuing to engage
that norm.  To speak of these  prices,  however, requires  meaning
talk,  and  meaning  talk  might  in  turn  cue  us  to  better  ways  to
regulate social norms.
Two examples will make the point.  The first is drawn from the
history  of techniques  used  to  regulate  dueling.14  Dueling  was  a
norm of the elite, in America as in Europe.  At some point in both
contexts,  there  was  political  resolve  to  eliminate  the  practice.
Compare two techniques  for eliminating the practice:  prohibiting
dueling  and  disqualifying  people  who  have  dueled from  holding
public office.
Both techniques increase the cost of dueling; and in the abstract,
or rather, abstracted from the particular social context of dueling,
one might think that the first is  more costly than the second.  But
a meaning account suggests something different.  When challenged
to a duel, the gentleman rightfully challenged is called upon to put
himself at great risk in the name of defending his honor before the
community. 5  The  first  regulation  just  increases  the  expected
harm  of that  challenge.  Now  the  expected  harm includes  some
(perhaps slight) chance that the person accepting the challenge will
also suffer the costs of jail.  That no doubt is a significant cost, but
it is no different in kind from, say, the increased expected costs due
to more accurate weapons.  These are personal  costs that the chal-
lenged might bear to defend  his honor in the community.
' I discuss this point in greater detail in Lawrence Lessig, The Regulation of  Social
Meaning, 62 U.  CHI. L.  REv.  943, 968-73 (1995).
1 Note that the additional costs of the sanction are imposed only upon conviction,
which itself is a low probability  event.SOCIAL MEANING AND  SOCIAL NORMS
The second technique functions somewhat differently.  As well
as  the duty to defend one's honor, a gentleman has a duty to serve
his community.  Dueling conflicts with that second public duty, and
the  refusal  to  duel  now  has  a  plausible  public-regarding  reason
associated  with it.  With the first technique,  refusing a challenge
simply  means  one  is  a coward;  with  the  second  technique,  it is
ambiguous whether one refuses the duel because one is a coward or
because one is serving a second, and competing, public duty.
The second technique ambiguates the social meaning of refusing
a challenge;  the first technique  does not.  The  second  technique
creates (or can create) a plausible claim that the reason one refuses
the  duel  is  public-regarding,  rather  than  merely  self-regarding.
Ambiguation  thus  reduces  the  social  meaning  cost  of refusing a
challenge, and it does this by mucking about with the context within
which such a refusal would be made.  Only an account that focused
upon this context could understand the contours that this develop-
ment presents.
The second example of the prescriptive  advantage  of meaning
talk  uses  the  opposite  technique.  Rather  than  ambiguating  the
social meaning of a particular act, this example  tries to reduce  the
ambiguity  in the social  meaning of a particular  act.  Kahan  again
supplies an example.
Kahan notes the increasingly frequent use of imprisonment as
a technique of punishment.16  This, as economists have long noted,
is odd.  It is odd because many of these offenses could be punished
more cheaply by fines rather than imprisonment.  Imprisonment is
both costly  to society and costly to the individual.  For those  with
assets, fines  could be set that would create  equivalent deterrence,
but with  nothing  comparable  to  the equivalent  cost.  So  why the
move to imprisonment?
Kahan's answer relies  on an ambiguity in the social meaning of
fines.  Fines can be viewed both as punishments and also as prices.
They can, that is, be seen both as condemnatory, and also as simply
the  price a  defendant  must pay  to engage  in  a certain  activity."
16See  Dan M.  Kahan,  What Do Alternative Sanctions Mean?, 63 U.  CHI.  L.  REV.
(forthcoming Spring 1996) (manuscript at 593, 607) (noting that "[i]mprisonment is
the  punishment  of choice  in  American  jurisdictions"  and  that  "[a]  decade  of
significant reform  has not lessened  the dependence  of American jurisdictions on
imprisonment").
1 1 See id. (manuscript at 622) (stating that fines "are politically unacceptable not
because the public perceives that they are insufficiently severe, but because it believes
that fines are insufficiently expressive of condemnation").
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This ambiguity is costly for the criminal justice system.  It  is costly
because it reduces the usefulness of fines.18  If fines were unambig-
uously condemnatory,  then the political system could impose them
without the fear that they would be viewed as something other than
condemnation.  To  the  extent  that  their  meaning is  ambiguous,
however, the political cost of using fines as punishment is high.
Kahan's  solution  is  to  change  the  meanings  of a  fine;  his
technique is tying.  By  tying the fine to some other unambiguously
condemnatory punishment,  one reduces  on the  margin the ambi-
guity in fining and thereby increases the availability of fining.  For
example, by tying the fine to a small amount of imprisonment,  or
alternatively  some  shaming  punishment,  the  ambiguity  in  the
meaning of fining is reduced.19
In both the dueling and fining example, the meaning perspective
adds  a  technique  for  changing  the  costs  associated  with  certain
behaviors  by altering  the interpretive  context within  which  those
behaviors exist.  Price is always a function of context.  Meaning talk
simply  points  to  the  techniques  for changing  context  that  might
change  the  cost  of behaviors  within  that context.  Ambiguation
changes the cost by making it unclear just what meaning an action
has.  Tying  changes  the  cost  by making  it more  clear just what
meaning an action has.2"  This focus on context is  what norm talk
cannot easily add.
Of course, meaning talk is not cheap, at least epistemically.  One
cannot use meaning talk to speak in ways that purport to be general
laws  of humanity.  Meaning  prescriptions,  and  descriptions,  are
more  local,  more  contingent.  Meanings  are  often highly contest-
able21 and sometimes  hard to know.
's  See id. (manuscript at 623) (arguing that if a fine is not viewed as a sanction that
invariably condemns, like imprisonment, but rather is viewed as a price, then "a fine,
no matter how large, won't be viewed as an adequate substitute for an appropriate
term of imprisonment").
19 See id. (manuscript at 655).
0 For a further discussion of these two techniques, see Lessig, supra note  14, at
1009-12.  Jack Balkin suggests  that the techniques  of tying and ambiguation exist
within a nested opposition-that we might see each  as the inverse of the other.  See
J.M. Balkin, Nested Oppositions, 99  YALE  LJ. 1669, .1696-1704  (1990)  (book review)
(pointing out that essentialism defines nested opposition).  This is correct.
21 This, for example, was Ronald Dworkin's view of Michael Walzer's use of  social
meaning talk.  See Ronald  Dworkin, To Each His Own, N.Y.  REV.  BOOKS,  Apr.  14,
1983,  at 4,  4  (reviewing  MICHAEL  WALZER,  SPHERES  OF JUSTICE:  A  DEFENSE  OF
PLURALISM AND EQUALITY (1983)) (arguing that Walzer's theory fails because "[i]t  tells
us to look to social conventions to discover the appropriate principles of distribution
for particular goods, but the very fact that we debate about whatjustice requires...SOCIAL MEANING AND  SOCIAL NORMS
My argument, however, is about value, not cost.  The argument
is that there is a positive return from meaning talk, not that one can
engage  it at a zero  price.  The claim  is  that something  is  missed,
both descriptively and prescriptively, without meaning talk, and that
some  of what  is  missed  might  be  gained  with  it.  The  claim  is
comparative, not absolute.
The  consequence  may  be  a  limit  in  generality.  But if one
consequence  of engaging  meaning  talk  is  a  greater  humility  in
economics-speak generally, who is to  say this would be so bad?  It
might well be that resistance  to economics-speak generally  comes
from this air of imperialism. 22  A  meaning manager might suggest
tying the message to something less grand:  giving up a bit of the
drama, aspiring less to what seem like laws of nature, and acknowl-
edging pragmatism as the only foundation.  All this may change the
meaning  of  economics-speak  and  thereby  reduce  the  cost  of
engaging it in law.  Or so some might think, and others recommend.
shows that we have no conventions  of the necessary sort").
2  Se4  e.g., JAMEs  B. WHITE, JUSTICE As TRANSLATION  46-82 (1990).
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